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TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND SOCIAL HISTORY
New Pathways of Learning When Max U (own reward) Fails Decisively
Vernon L. Smith 1
Chapman University

In 1995, Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe (hereafter BDM)
inaugurated entirely new directions of experimental investigation, business
research, and human sociability in their study of trust and trustworthiness (BDM
called it trust and reciprocity). Building on research results from the study of
ultimatum and dictator games, BDM ignited widespread research interest—Google
Scholar indicates 5242 citations through September, 2019. Johnson and Mislin
(2011) offer a meta-analysis of BDM using data from 162 replications across 35
countries, and 23,000 subjects, but replications and extensions have continued
unabated since these data were assembled. Few experiments have approached that
of BDM in launching such extensive further investigation.
What accounts for the incredible scholarly popularity of the BDM protocol and its
many derivative studies?
Subjects in the BDM protocol chose unexpectedly high levels of cooperative otherregarding action, under conditions of strict privacy and anonymity that invited selfinterested action under a heavy cloak of secrecy. Their findings seemed at odds
with dictator games in which similar conditions of anonymity and secrecy had
greatly reduced dictator game “generosity.” After all, BDM was “merely” a two
stage dictator game. The observations also appeared to be at complete odds with
the own-regarding actions that had dominated in market experiments beginning a
half century earlier. (Chamberlin, 1948; Smith, 1962; see Holt, 2019, pp 1-35 for a
historical summary) 2 The BDM investment game challenged the beliefs underlying
economic modelling, altered research directions, and ignited a search for
understanding—for reconciling disparate bodies of data, each highly replicable and
coming from people in the same sampling populations. Can these distinct and
contradictory patterns be reconciled in one underlying theory, or are we stuck with
a two-regime theoretical justification?
I am grateful to Andreas Ortmann for his careful reading of two earlier drafts of this paper and providing
extensive comment, while not absolving myself from responsibility for and errors that remain.
2
As we shall see below these appearances were not correct; both own-regarding and other-regarding human
action are consistent with strictly self-interested preferences in Smith (1759; 1853). The path-breaking work of
BDM has helped immeasurably in enabling Smith’s classical work to be rehabilitated.
1
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This evaluation begins with the BDM protocol—itself a methodological
contribution—and the experimental findings. The question of the replicability and
robustness of these unexpected results is addressed next in a summary of two
subsequent experimental papers. We follow with a discussion of two attempts to
explain qua understand the BDM findings; both, however, have methological
deficiencies—Reciprocity and Social Preference explanations. Finally, we offer a
brief on Adam Smith’s (1759; 1853; hereafter in the text, Sentiments) model of
human sociability, based on strictly self-interested actors, that culminates in
propositions that (1) account for trust game choices, and (2) predict action in new
variations on trust game designs that, in the absence of Adam Smith’s model,
would be neither natural or well-motivated.
THE BDM PROTOCOL: FIRST RESULTS AND “SOCIAL HISTORY”
REPLICATION
Introduction
Across three sessions BDM recruited 32 pairs of subjects. In each session half the
individuals were recruited for room A, and half for room B. 3 Each received ten $1
bills as an upfront payment for showing up on time—an intentional form of earned
compensation that belongs to the individual. Each person in room A is free to
select from their money payment any number, from 0 to 10 one-dollar bills to be
sent to their anonymous and randomly paired counterpart in room B. In route, the
sum is tripled before delivery to the person’s counterpart in room B. BDM
implemented a double-anonymity protocol wherein each pair is anonymous with
respect to each other and to any and all third parties including the experimenters.
No one can know who sent whom how much money.
This procedure was a departure from commonly practiced protocols and generated
some entirely appropriate controversy that we will discuss as part of our
reexamination and review. 4 Methodological challenges—what does it mean to test
a theory? —are part of daily life in any and all experimental sciences. That
meaning emerges out of the personal experiences and conversation of
experimentalists whose “knowledge in science is not made but discovered, and as
such it claims to establish contact with reality beyond the clues on which it
relies….For we live in it as in the garment of our own skin.” (Polanyi, 1964, p 64;
When the subjects were recruited, they were told to come to either room A or B, making it credible that there
really were two rooms (no deception); a monitor was chosen in each room to carry envelops to the other room,
further making it evident that real people were paired with real people and no deception was possible. Also, by not
first meeting in one room, there was additional social control in support of the concept of paired “strangers.”
4
Every experimental science depends on an immense body of “experimental knowledge,” a specialized form of
human capital based on practice and the ongoing evaluation, and re-evaluation, of the state of that knowledge;
this is the life blood of any experimental science. (Mayo, 1996; Smith, 2008, chapter 13)
3
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also see Mayo, 1996 on the role of experimental methodology in reducing belief
error.)
The Dictator Game as a Precursor of the Investment Trust Game
The dictator game (DG) evolved from the study of the ultimatum game (UG) as
part of explorations designed to better understand the unexpected findings by Guth,
Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) who originated the UG. In this game the
Proposer offers to split M one-dollar bills with the Responder, yielding (Proposer
payoff, Responder payoff) = (M—X, X). M is commonly $10 or $20. Play then
passes to the Responder who either accepts the offer, in which case the imputation
is (M—X, X), or rejects the offer, in which case the outcome is (0, 0). If the
players are each strictly self-interested and always choosing dominant own payoff
outcomes, the predicted equilibrium offer is (M—1, 1), since $1 clearly dominates
0, and the Responder is predicted to accept. On average, Proposers offer about
0.45M, and Responders accept almost all offers. Responders routinely tend to
reject infrequent offers of $1 or $2 and even of $3.
The predominance of offers of $4 and $5 led to the ex post hoc explanation that
people had a strong preference for “fairness” or an equal-outcome division of M.
This interpretation was challenged by Forsythe, et al. (1994). They argued that if
the results were driven by a strong preference for equal split “fairness” then the
results would not be effected by eliminating the Responder’s right to veto the
Proposer’s offer. Hence, they compare UG treatments with and without the
responder being allowed to veto the offer, and report mean offers of 0.47M when
Responder can veto, and (significantly less) 0.24M when Responder cannot veto
(See Camerer, 2003, Tables 2.2 and 2.3, pp 50-55; and 2.4, pp 57-58; he
conveniently reports data from all the early studies). The no-veto treatment quickly
became known as the DG and took on an experimental life of its own.
Next—in this scenario from UG to DG to BDM—enters Hoffman et al. (1994;
hereafter HMSS) who report many treatment variations on the UG and the DG. 5 In
particular, although DG offers are significantly less than UG offers reported in
Forsythe et al. (1994), HMSS were intrigued and impressed by the fact that
dictators are nevertheless giving away twenty-four percent of their endowments.
To stress the boundary of these unexpected, but persistent DG results, they

The reader should note that the four papers in this scenario were all published in 1994-1995 as the various
authors were all in contact with each other and working from pre-publication drafts of their respective papers.
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introduce a “double-blind” procedure to see if DG generosity is materially reduced,
or stubbornly resistant, to this treatment protocol. 6
Legitimacy of the Double-Blind Treatment Component
The double-blind treatment procedures used by HMSS and by BDM, has been
criticized as representing an illegitimate experimenter-demand effect “by too
clearly indicating the goals of the experimenter.” (Kagel and Roth, 1995, p 303)
This constitutes a misunderstanding of the purpose and objectives behind this
protocol. BDM and HMSS, in controlling for reputation and other social effects,
intentionally sought to invite and encourage strictly self-serving action by making
it surveillance-safe and transparent, that it is ok not to send money, and ok to keep
any money received. (Smith, 1982, refers to such explorations as boundary
experiments) HMSS found that the procedure substantially (as well as
significantly) lowered dictator giving (on average from 0.24M to 0.10M, with the
percent giving nothing rising from 20% to 60%). Similarly, in BDM, which is
merely a two stage DG, we have a doubling of the opportunity to secretly give
nothing. If cooperation fails, we have evidence of the power of self-interested
motivation—Max-U(own)—to be expressed under the cloak of secrecy as a control
for social value and influence. If cooperation persists, we meaningfully expand the
range of conditions where the standard “strangers” model fails. In exploring the
boundaries of that persistence, the BDM experiment either expands the range of
self-interested action, or launches us into explorations of why robust cooperation
trumps the temptation to serve private advantage?
We were not to be disappointed in this polarizing stress test, for BDM find that the
dramatic effect found by HMSS in reduced DG giving does not carry over to the
trust game. Moreover, far from reducing cooperation it is substantially increased.
Hence, the interpretation that people in the BDM trust game see it in a completely
different way than they see the DG. The trust game is indeed much different than a
sequential DG—the tripling of any amount sent implies gains from trust/trustee
interaction, a synergy that is absent in DG, and it is this leveraging of the reward
stakes that seems to invite a much different experiential response, such as the
BDM emphasis on “reciprocity”.
The important learning from these experiments is that other-regarding action
trumps and robustly survives instructional treatments designed strongly to
encourage self-interested action. This powerful finding demonstrates the strength
of human sociability, and robustly falsifies the traditional economic and gameThe term “double-blind” is used here in the sense that subject identity is protected (1) between and among the
subjects participating in a (“single-blind”) experiment, but is also protected (2) between the subject, the
experimenter, and any other potential observer.
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theoretic modeling based on self-interested action. Methodologies that preclude
such boundary experiments because of unexamined hypothetical experimenterdemand effects fail to afford opportunities for identifying the edges of validity of
new and unexpected findings—or establish that there are no edges.
Beyond the moral imperative that subjects be treated with respect, dignity,
payment for their earnest service, and strict adherence to the principle that the
experimenter shalt not bear false witness (don’t lie to the subjects or anyone else),
experimental methods must be free and open to new means of learning. 7
For a non-cooperative equilibrium of the game, sufficient conditions are that (1) all
are strictly self-interested, (2) this is common knowledge, and (3) each chooses to
maximize their own utilitarian outcome. It follows that individuals in room A are
predicted to send nothing; those in room B return nothing if any money is sent.
This prediction does badly even under the supposed favorable condition where no
one, not even the experimenter, can know the identity of any individual actor. The
primary implication was that it was a good idea for researchers to seek better ways
of thinking about two-person connectedness. Massive prediction failure ought to
motivate re-evaluation and new learning on a similar scale. As we aim to show
here, that failure was not newsworthy within the framework of Sentiments,
published over two hundred fifty years before BDM. Moreover, this classical
contribution to social psychology expands the range of new experimental designs
and prediction. Our only excuse was that we were either ignorant of Sentiments or
did not understand its message for embracing BDM and their aftermath.
BDM Results
On average, individuals in room A sent $5.16, but the average amount returned
was $4.66; two subjects sent zero and five sent $10; twenty-eight of thirty-two
people in room A sent more than $1. Since sending money yielded an overall loss,
senders’ beliefs in the game appeared mistaken. Hence, BDM followed with their
“social history” treatment in which new subjects, informed by a summary of the
first experiment results, could adapt and correct their beliefs. The social history
summary treatment reported the number of subjects sending each amount from
$1.00 to $10.00, the average amount returned and average profit of the sender; the
only net profitable amounts sent were $5 and $10.
However, the BDM conjecture—that subjects would correct their belief error—
was not supported: Now, the average amount sent increases slightly to $5.36, but
Psychological research traditions are not self-bound by any such moral imperative although the latter is rooted in
the experimental research of the psychologist, Sydney Siegel, one of the early founders of experimental
economics. (Smith, 2017)
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the average returned increases to $6.46. The baseline norm, “be generous in
sending” does not unravel in the social history treatment, while the trustworthy
norm, “be generous in rewarding trust” is enhanced; 3 of 28 send nothing, half (14)
of those in room A send $5 or $10, with only one recipient in room B keeping all
that was sent.

SKEPTICS CHALLENGE THE BDM RESULTS, FIND ONLY
CONFIRMING EVIDENCE, AND SIGNIFICANTLY EXTEND THE
DOMAIN OF BDM APPLICABILITY
In the large subsequent literature, two studies, both by scholars skeptical of the
robustness of these remarkable findings, continued to observe results inconsistent
with Max-U (own payoff) rationality in experiments motivated by the BDM
findings. In the first, Andreas Ortmann, John Fitzgerald, and Carl Boeing (2000;
hereafter OFB) comprehensively replicated and reexamined the BDM experiments
adding new treatments that they hypothesized would change the findings.
They study five treatments:
First, a baseline “No History” treatment which replicated the original BDM
experiments.
Second, a replication of the BDM “Social History” treatment by presenting
the results from the first baseline treatment, precisely as did BDM, by
simply presenting the values of previous investments and returns in a table. 8
Third, a “Social History” treatment framing the previous experimental
results in terms of the portion that room B participants returned to A, clearly
showing room A participants that the returns were not equitable.
Fourth, a second “baseline No History treatment” characterized, however, by
several key modifications.

8

Experimental economists often encounter journal editorial resistance to publishing “mere replications,”

especially in the leading journals that seek to pioneer new and innovative work, while personally placing high
priority on the scientific importance of replications. The solution to this challenge for many has taken the form of
combining replication with new treatment variations on the original motivating study. (Smith, 1994, p 128)
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Specifically, OFB included a questionnaire for the room A
participants which they were to complete prior to their decision.
Specifically, this questionnaire had two purposes. First, it was to
ensure that room A subjects understood the design and considered
their decisions carefully before making them. Second, it was to help
subjects determine how much to invest by encouraging them to think
carefully (prompt strategic reasoning) 9 about the consequences of
their decisions before they made them. The subjects were asked the
following four questions:
1. How much money do you think you will send?
2. How much money will your room B counterpart receive if
you send this much?
3. How much money do you think will be returned to you?
4. How much money would you return if you were in room B?
The authors hypothesized that by changing the presentation format in
Treatment Three, and prompting strategic reasoning as in Treatment Four it
would cause significant drops in both the amounts sent to room B from A,
and consequently the amounts returned to room A from B. As we shall see,
however, these modifications had no effect.
Fifth, Treatment Five and Five R each applied the combined modifications
of Treatments Three and Four, with Five R a replication of Treatment Five
designed to further test the statistical significance finding in Treatment Five.
“When Berg et al. used their social history treatment, contributions did not
change much. The median remained at $5 and only 3 out of 28 subjects sent
zero…none of our treatments led to significantly different results. This
means that neither the way information is presented (BDM presentation,
OFB presentation) nor strategic reasoning prompts (the questionnaire)
matter statistically to our subject pool. In fact, as the results for treatment
Five and its replication show, nor do these two modifications to the original
design matter jointly if we pool the data.” (Ortmann, et al., 2000, pp 85-6) In
their abstract OFB express the unexpectedness of their findings: “To our

Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (2000) used instructions to “prompt” subjects to think about what their paired
counterpart would do in the UG, but it simply focused them on the prospect that Responder might veto the
proposal (not on the strategic idea that $1 was better than nothing, which ought to be acceptable), and their offers
became more generous.

9
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surprise, none of our various treatments led to a reduction in the amount
invested.”
A second skeptical examination of BDM substantially alters the BDM framework,
while polarizing the potential outcome depending upon how the subjects’ respond.
(McCabe and Smith, 2000; hereafter MS) Senders in the BDM game can choose
any of eleven amounts from zero to ten dollars to send to their counterpart; if X
dollars are sent (0 ≤ X ≤ 10), receivers can return any amounts from zero up to and
including 3X dollars.
MS dichotomize the choices for each of the players so that each can choose only
two starkly contrasting actions. The MS payoffs are motivated by BDM, but the
BDM context—two people matched in a sending, tripling and returning money
relationship—is stripped out of the MS narrative. One of only two actions by each
of the players provides the largest self-interested outcome, the other a “fair” equal
split of the joint gains. Thus, Player 1 can choose to send nothing—the selfinterested “best” outcome, yielding the payoff: (Player 1= $10; Player 2 = $10).
Or, alternatively, Player 1 chooses to send the entire ten dollars, which is tripled to
thirty dollars. Player 2 can only respond with either of two actions: split the thirty
dollars equally with Player 1, yielding the payoff (Player 1 = $15; Player 2 = $25 =
$10 + $15), or take all the money resulting in the payoff (Player 1= $0; Player 2 =
$40 =$10 + $ 30). In the first option, Player 1 receives a 50 percent larger amount
than if nothing is sent. However, Player 2 receives an increase that is 150 percent
larger than if Player 1 sent nothing. Clearly, Player 2 is made strictly and
asymmetrically better off. In the second option, however, Player 1 can end with
nothing.
By removing all context and starkly focusing on the hazards to any Player 1 who
passes to Player 2, MS intentionally probe the boundary of validity of the original
BDM results hypothesizing that this will discourage cooperative play.
Remarkably and surprisingly the frequencies with which subjects offered and
accepted the cooperative chose actions that were trusting and trustworthy were
high enough that, on average, the earnings of both players increased relative to the
self-interested equilibrium payoffs. Of twenty-four undergraduates, Twelve Player
1s’ (50 percent) passed play to their counterpart Player 2 and nine of the twelve
responded cooperatively (75 %), only three taking all the money (25 %).
Also MS report the data for twenty-eight graduate PhD students who play the same
game twice, knowing that they will retain the same pairing.
First Play: Twenty-one (75%) pass to their counterpart Player 2, of which 16
(76%) choose to cooperate, and only five ((24%) take all the money. Second
8

Play: Fourteen (50%) of Player 1s pass to their Player 2s of which nine
(64%) cooperate, and only five (36%) defect.
Far from failing this simplified, alleged self-interest promoting test, the MS
subjects were even more other-regarding in rejecting non-cooperative action and
tended to earn more money than in the BDM game. Thus, did MS introduce a
simplified design that enabled subjects to better coordinate actions designed to
achieve their cooperative intentions.
How are we to explain these findings, so bizarre by accustomed economic
standards?
RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL PREFERNCE EXPLANATIONS
Reciprocity Explanation
As indicated in their title, reciprocity as an explanation of trusting and trustworthy
behavior was very much part of how BDM thought about their discovery. Their
title was not “Trust, Trustworthiness and Social History;” trustworthiness was
identified with reciprocity in a non-market exchange.
By sending money the first mover in the BDM game is offering to cooperate; by
returning money the second mover is accepting the offer in an exchange;
“reciprocity” is simply a word for describing those two actions. 10 How can a
description of what transpires be an explanation of why we observe the behavior?
The argument is circular. (Smith and Wilson, 2019) 11
Social preference Explanation
Social preference theory had its origins in the proposition that other-regarding
action is a direct consequence of other-regarding preference or utility functions.
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002) What seemed to fail in BDM was the neoclassical
assumption that people cared only about their own payoff. Thus—for generations
of economists brought up on utility as the cause of all action—it was natural to
Many of us fell into that pattern. Smith (1998) elevates reciprocity to the key to an understanding of the
connection between Adam Smith’s (1759, 1776) two books. This is neither wrong, nor very deep, as an explanation
of the results in BDM and the large subsequent literature demonstrating the robustness of their results.
11
The same circular reasoning has been accepted to explain the strong tendency toward equal-split outcomes in
the UG. The preference for “fair” outcomes is said to be the explanation and the cause. However, equal-split “fair”
outcomes also constitute what is observed, which itself cannot serve as an explanation and a cause. It is correct to
state that “[t]he (UG) data falsify the assumption that players maximize their own payoffs as clearly as
experimental data can” which recognizes the contradiction between prediction and observation. But it is leading
and questionable to add: “Since the equilibria are so simple to compute,… the ultimatum game is a crisp way to
measure social preferences rather than a deep test of strategic thinking.” (Camerer, 2005, p 43) This inference
follows only if all action is a direct consequence of preference, but it takes only one non-preference-based model
of action to negate it. Sentiments performs that function.
10
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explain the new findings with a utility of the form U(own payoff, other payoff) in
which actions reflected the actors concern about other as well as own payoff in the
trust game. But if social preference is to be the predictor of action, we need to
know the form of the Utility function in advance. For example, suppose Player 1
has social presences such that they want to transfer money to Player 2. Suppose
Player 1 passes to player 2, and Player 1 defects; that mat be a better outcome than
if Player 2 chooses the cooperative outcome. Social preference theory cannot
assume that defection hurts Player 1. If Player 1 is given the opportunity to punish
defection by Player 2, some do, but most do not. The methodology is that of
retrofitting utility to actions discovered empirically, then looking for “epi-cycle”
parameters that accommodate the observation. 12
Attempts to solve the puzzle—How do we explain and reconcile other-regarding
action in BDM and its extensions with the self-interested acts of the same
individuals in markets and other contexts—led to decades of experimental
explorations. The puzzle also contributed to the discovery that Sentiments provided
an independent means of interpreting and modelling action, wherein all individuals
are strictly self-interested in preference, but follow rules that are other regrading.
That development and its history in recounted in (Smith and Wilson, 2019, pp xiiixx.)
HUMANOMICS OF TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS: WHY
STRICTLY SELF-INTERESTED ACTORS CAN MAKE GOOD
NEIGHBORS
The subtitle of Sentiments states succinctly its message, “An Essay towards an
Analysis of the Principles by which Men Naturally Judge the Conduct and
Character, First of their neighbors and then of themselves.” (Smith, 1759; 1853,
title page)
In Sentiments we learn an alternative to reciprocity and social preference
explanations of cooperation in our lives and in our experimental trust game data.
Cooperation stems from human sociability and is governed by our rule-following
conduct; the very word “conduct” suggests a pattern of proper manners emanating
from our judgement of each other. Our actions are other-regarding as well as ownregarding. Moreover, these actions are not direct consequences of our preferences,
which are strictly self-interested, and not in any way conflictual with our actions
either in markets or in our social world. To understand Sentiments, as economists
who study behavior, we must distinguish between our self-interested preferences,
Added to this procedure is the fact that “there is a professional tendency to view utility explanations as final—
once a result is deemed due to utility the conversation stops, implying that there is nothing left to explain or test.”
Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (2008, p 415).

12
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and our actions, which need not take the form of acting in accordance with this
principle; that is, action need not have the form: Action if and only if Max U(own).
“Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast,
naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in
the face, and avow that he acts according to this principle. He feels that in
this preference they can never go along with him, and that how natural
soever it may be to him, it must always appear excessive and extravagant to
them. When be views himself in the light in which he is conscious that
others will view him he sees that to them be is but one of the multitude, in
no respect better than any other in it. If he would act so as that the impartial
spectator 13 may enter into the principles of his conduct, which is what of all
things he has the greatest desire to do, he must upon this, as upon all other
occasions, humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to
something which other men can go along with.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 120)
In fact, common knowledge that we are all self-interested is a necessary part of
how we automatically know that a context-specific action is beneficial or hurtful to
another and are thus able to implement the rules we follow in interacting with our
neighbors. (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 112)
What are the circumstances of life that determine this rule-following means of
disciplining our actions?
Smith observes that about the time we start to school and “mix with equals” we
find that our play-fellows do not show the “indulgent partiality” of our parents in
tolerating our expressions of anger; they use punishment to express their
displeasure with our hurtful actions towards them, and find ways to reward our
beneficent actions toward them. Thus, do we enter “the great school of selfcommand” in “which the practice of the longest life is very seldom sufficient to
bring to complete perfection.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 204, 206). 14
The “impartial spectator” in Sentiments is a metaphor for the means by which we learn to judge our own actions
in the light or their impact on others—based on our sympathetic fellow-feeling toward others—and to choose in a
manner that is properly other-regarding, and not only self-regarding. “We endeavour to examine our own conduct
as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation,
we thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the
approbation of this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it.”
(Smith, 1759; 1853, p 162)
14
For Adam Smith self-command (or self-government) is the omnipresent gatekeeper of virtue and many
situations may allow the “voice of human weakness” to undermine this self-command. (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 29)
Consequently, higher stakes may tempt a decrease in trust/trustworthiness. But meta-analysis finds this not to be
the case; generally the results documented by BDM and OFB were further validated, indicating bedrock support for
trust and trustworthiness as expressions of human beneficence even under conditions of anonymity. (Johnson and
Mislin, 2011, p 874)
13
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The first proposition implied by the analysis in Sentiments—that drives the
experimental observations in BDM, OFB and MS—is the following: “Actions of a
beneficent tendency, which proceed from proper motives, seem alone to require a
reward; because such alone are the approved objects of gratitude, or excite the
sympathetic gratitude of the spectator.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 112)
By proper motives, Smith is referring to intentionality: I do something good for
you because I wanted to do something good for you. And he is here asserting the
strong directive that such action alone induces in us a compulsion to reward the
action, and this is because of the spontaneous fellow-feeling of gratitude that we
experience. Furthermore, this is not just what the individual who is the target of the
action experiences and responds to, but it also commands the agreement of every
indifferent spectator. That is, every third-party observer easily agrees, or fellow
feels, with the target of the action. 15 In modern language we would call it a “social
norm,” and here Smith is articulating a theory with specific a priori predictions of
its action consequences.
Regrettably, our abysmal ignorance of Sentiments prevented us, in the 1990s, from
hypothesizing the implied behavior before we observed it. 16
Later, Smith uses this proposition to derive “reciprocity” (logically, as an
implication) although he does not use that word in that context. Rather he asks who
above all we should be kind to. Those who have been kind to us. Thus “Kindness
is the parent of kindness.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 331) This is called the Principle
of Beneficent Reciprocity by Smith and Wilson (2014, p 16). Hence, Sentiments
provides the underlying explanation for reciprocity, and is not circular as in the
original trust game literature.
Let us now think through the application of Smith’s first beneficence proposition
to BDM (OFB) and MS. The first mover is clearly under no obligation to send any
Note the critical role for human fellow-feeling in Sentiments and the following corroborating results of trust
game meta-analysis showing that it is important for senders to know that the receiver is a real person: “We also
find that playing with a real person is associated with significantly more sent. While researchers sometimes employ
simulated confederates to play the role of the receiver in the trust game, these studies rarely use a manipulation
check to confirm that the experimenter’s attempts to deceive the participants have been successful. Our findings
suggest that participants in such trust game experiments may in fact not all believe, as the experimenters wish
them to, that they are playing with real counterparts. This could be due to flaws in the experimental procedures
employed or even early participants informing later participants of the deception.” (Johnson and Misilin, p. 875).
Recall that the BDM protocol made it credible that real people were matched with each other across two rooms.
16
Harking back to those exciting discovery years, I should note that, even if we were given then our current
understanding of Sentiments, there was reason aplenty for being skeptical that the proposition would be
predictive—it might easily fail because of the deep cloak of secrecy implemented by BDM and OFB (but not MS).
Hence, the BDM launch would have been no less path-breaking, by virtue of extending Sentiments significantly
beyond its original presumed domain.
15
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money, nor for the recipient to return money if any is sent. Moreover, the first
mover is clearly at risk in getting nothing back. Knowing this, the recipient of any
money sent can only infer that money was sent intentionally—an action that
obviously and unambiguously benefits the recipient. Smith’s proposition predicts
that the recipient feels gratitude and is motivated to reward the action by returning
some money. How much? Well, more in positive relation to the benefit and
gratitude felt--“the greater exertions of that virtue appear to deserve the highest
reward. By being productive of the greatest good, they are the natural and
approved objects of the liveliest gratitude.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 117) Smith’s
theory, culminating in this proposition, predicts the tendency expressed in the data
of BDM and OFB, but found more prominently in MS.
Over and over, Sentiments stresses the importance of context, and across the BDM,
OFC and MS treatments, context is being varied. (Also see Hoffman, McCabe and
Smith, 2000) The data show clearly that context matters; the three studies all
confirm Sentiments relative to utilitarian action in the self-interest, but actions in
the MS game are most strongly consistent with Smith’s first proposition on
beneficence. In MS, Player 1 sends a strong and unambiguous signal of benefit, or
none, and this dichotomy, we can conjecture, accounts for the proposition’s greater
consistency with MS.
It should be noticed how natural it is to think about how Sentiments applies to the
actions of the subjects. If the model fails, we know where to look for the cause.
Gratitude may not be felt as with sociopathic-like tendencies. Or, gratitude might
be felt, but it is insufficient to overcome the temptation to defect, suggesting
further experiments that vary payoffs. In contrast, if the traditional dominantstrategy, self-interested choice model fails, it says nothing about what to do next.
We are left with no guidelines as to the next scientific step.
I will close by stating a second proposition in Sentiments on beneficence and apply
it to a new trust game in the MS framework. “Beneficence is always free, it cannot
be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment; because the
mere want of beneficence tends to do no real positive evil. It may disappoint of the
good which might reasonably have been expected, and upon that account it may
justly excite dislike and disapprobation: it cannot, however, provoke any
resentment which mankind will go along with.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 112)
Two recent experimental studies are directly motivated by this important
proposition in which the benefit-reward calculus governed by the first proposition
is said to be voided if there is any threat of coercion, thus predictively bounding
the domain of conditions over which the first applies.
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The first study observes that the literature on the UG is replete with evidence
that Responders feel and express much anger which in turn explains the
pattern of rejections across UG treatments. Since UG participation is always
involuntarily assigned by the experimenter, this suggests a treatment effect
emanating from the influence of coercion—the implicit threat of veto by the
Responder. In new UG experiments, the Responders move first, choosing to
either exit the game along with their paired Proposer, each receiving $1, or
voluntarily entering the UG stage by passing to the Proposer who choose
between an equal split of $24, or the equilibrium outcome (Player 1 = $2.
Player 2 = $22). Ninety-four percent of Responders signal willingness-toplay by passing play to the proposer. Remarkably, forty percent of the
proposers offer the equilibrium option, and sixty-one percent accept—the
highest known rate of equilibrium play, and of acceptance recorded in the
extensive UG literature (Smith and Wilson, 2018; 2019, pp 135-141). 17
The second study directly tests Adam Smith’s second beneficent proposition
in a new trust game, with the same extensive form structure as in MS, but
different payoffs. Player 1’s have two options: (1) pass to Player 2, who
chooses the equilibrium ($12, $12), or ($10, $10); (2) pass to Player 2, who
chooses either (Payoff 1, Payoff 2) = ($$18, $30), or ($6, $42). If Player 1
decides to not cooperate and choose the equilibrium option (1), and if Player
2 wishes to punish Player I at a cost, we have the outcome ($10, $10). No
Player 2 so chooses: Of thirty-eight pairs in this game, twenty-three Player
1’s select option (1), but none choose to punish the action. 18
CONCLUSIONS
That “Trust, Reciprocity and Social History” was a landmark paper in the history
of experimental economics is indicated by several measures of academic impact:
Citations, of course, but more precisely the results were unexpected, surprising and
continue to inspire new trust game experiments; the results were replicable and
robust; and they defined, along with the ultimatum game, the canonical structure
and protocol for using trust games to examine human sociality.
However, with the discovery that the results are consistent with key propositions in
Sentiments—the lesser known first book written by the founder of economics,
Of course the Proposer may or may not also feel anger; allowing the Proposer to voluntarily choose whether or
not to enter the game may further impact their joint outcome.
18
Yet in sharp contrast, Justice Propositions in Sentiments predict that if Player 1 offers cooperation, and Player 2
defects, then—given a costly option to punish the defection—Player 1s will so choose, which indeed they do.
(Smith and Wilson, 2019, pp 152-153) Hence, Adam Smith states general conditions that predict when people will
use punishment strategies, and when they will not.
17
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Adam Smith—I believe the paper became an important part of demonstrating the
relevance of that monumental work for contemporary economics and the moral
foundations of the human career.
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